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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit considered a limited number of federal taxation
cases this year. All of the cases addressed fairly routine issues and followed
well-established legal precedents. However, an examination of the particu-
lar circumstances of the cases may clairfy the interpretation of the law by the
Tenth Circuit in the areas covered by these opinions.
I. BAD BUSINESS DEBTS
In Harsha v. United States, I an orthopedic surgeon had loaned and guar-
anteed money to a corporation whose sole purpose was to employ and reha-
bilitate a disabled patient. The court held that where such loans were made
to improve the patient's psychological well-being and not in good faith an-
ticipation of either advancing or preserving the profit motive expectations of
the doctor's medical practice, the losses sustained were non-business bad
debts. Non-business bad debts are deductible as short-term capital losses,
but business bad debts are fully deductible against ordinary income.
2
The key question on appeal was whether Harsha's losses were suffi-
ciently related to his medical practice so as to be fully deductible as bad
business debts, the proper standard of a "proximate" relation being whether
the taxpayer's dominant motivation in making the loans was to benefit his
trade or business. 3 To constitute one's trade or business for internal revenue
purposes, the activity must occupy a substantial amount of the taxpayer's
time and be undertaken in good faith for profit.
4
Because Harsha, by his own admissions, established that the loans and
guarantees were made absent any expectation of preserving the profit-mak-
ing activities of his medical practice, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court in granting summary judgment for the government. 5 The court indi-
cated that the key inquiry in assessing the question of dominant motivation
at the time loans or guarantees are made should revolve around the objective
facts rather than the taxpayer's subjective intent, but where the subject in-
tent is clearly not to benefit his trade or business, as was the case here, sum-
mary judgment against the taxpayer is proper.
6
1. 590 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. Id
3. Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 166(a), and the Treas-
ury regulations interpreting it for application to individual taxpayers require that a taxpayer
claiming a "business" bad debt establish that he is engaged in a trade or business and that the
loss has a proximate relation to the conduct of that trade or business. 590 F.2d at 886.
4. 590 F.2d at 887 (citing Imbesi v. C.I.R., 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966)).
5. 590 F.2d at 887.
6. Id at 886.
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II. TRIAL By JURY
United States v. Anderson7 involved the right to a trial by jury in tax cases.
The controversy arose mainly over an increase in gain which the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) said should be recognized from Anderson's sale of a
glass business to a corporation.8 Anderson refused and failed to pay the bal-
ance assessed at the district court level, arguing on appeal that it was revers-
ible error: (1) to deny him the right to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment; (2) to refuse to suppress evidence obtained by unlawful coer-
cion, threats and intimidation by the government; and (3) to deny his re-
quest that the amount sued for be defined other than in dollars because the
value of Federal Reserve notes is uncertain.9
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the judgment. The govern-
ment took the position that the defendant's demand for a jury trial was un-
timely insofar as it was filed more than ten days after his answer and
counterclaim, which the government unsuccessfully argued were his "final
pleadings."' 0 The court, refusing to consider the answer and counterclaim
to be final pleadings, held the demand was timely insofar as, at the time of
filing, questions about the sufficiency of the counterclaim alleging threats,
coercion and intimidation remained, and insofar as the issues raised in the
counterclaim were identical to those raised in the complaint."'
Satisfied that the demand was timely, the court found furthermore that
the trial court had acted correctly in deciding the issue on its merits rather
than rejecting it as untimely.' 2 On the merits, however, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the trial court and determined that the nature of the issue
comes within the seventh amendment and entitles the defendant to a jury
trial. Of importance to the court were the following factors: (1) English
common law established the right; (2) the remedy sought was for a personal
judgment for taxes assessed; and (3) the factual issue of tax liability as
presented was appropriate for jury resolution.
13
The court did not address the coercion issue other than to acknowledge
that the trial court found it to lack merit. 14 It did reject arguments that the
claim not be assessed in dollars as groundless.' 5
7. 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. The IRS found a greater benefit to the defendant through the assumption of his in-
debtedness by the corporation than he stated, and also disagreed with his basis in some equip-
ment and a building, among other things. Id at 370.
9. Id
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 38(b) provides:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving
upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commence-
ment of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue.
11. 584 F.2d at 372-73.
12. Id. at 371.
13. Id at 373-74 (citing Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and Damsky v. Zavatt, 289
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961)).
14. 584 F.2d at 371-72.
15. The court took judicial notice of the fact that federal reserve notes are valued in dol-
lars, citing both statutory and case law authority. Id at 374.
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III. VALIDITY OF SUBCHAPTER S ELECTION
In Bruische v. Commi'szoner,16 the court considered the validity of a sub-
chapter S election, which allows the shareholders of an electing corporation
which qualifies to avoid the double taxation of a corporation.' 7 The taxpay-
ers, who initially had argued that their election was valid, reversed their
position by arguing that the election was invalid because the filing was un-
timely and lacked the necessary shareholders' consent.
A. Timehness
In addressing the timeliness of the election, the court determined
whether Treasury Form 2553 was filed within the first month of the corpora-
tion's taxable year. The corporation had shareholders on May 1, 1961, con-
ducted business by May 26, 1961, and filed its election on June 26, 1961.
Section 1372 provides that a subchapter S election must be made by a small
business corporation during the first month of its taxable year or during the
preceding month, and Treasury Regulations 18 establish that the first month
of the taxable year for a new corporation begins when the corporation has
shareholders, acquires assets, or begins conducting business, whichever oc-
curs first. Accordingly, the June 26 election was not within the first month
and therefore not valid for that taxable year. It was, however, upon the
finding of a July 1-June 30 fiscal accounting period, determined timely for
the following fiscal year beginning in 1962 under section 441.19
B. Consent
Nonetheless, even if timely, the election was still invalid for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1962, if not accompanied by the requisite shreholders'
consent. Since the original consent submitted had been returned as defective
and incomplete by the IRS with the admonition that the election would be
ineffective unless a subsequent proper consent was filed within twenty days,
the issue became an evidentiary one.
20
Neither the Tax Court nor the Tenth Circuit found any direct evidence
of a later properly filed shareholder consent. The court agreed that the
Commissioner's position, that the election was not invalid for lack of the
second consent statement, was presumptively correct because a copy of the
letter extending the time for filing was in the taxpayers' records but the
Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court that an inference of compliance
necessarily flows therefrom. 21 To prove the election invalid on the grounds
asserted, taxpayers had the burden of showing that no consent was properly
filed, which burden they met insofar as it is possible to prove a negative.
Explaining that the nonexistence of a document or the nonoccurrence
of an event can only be shown by inference from circumstantial evidence,
16. 585 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1978).
17. I.R.C. §§ 1371-79.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(b)(1), T.D. 6500 (1960).
19. 585 F.2d at 439.
20. Id at 440.
21. Id at 441.
1980]
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and since no verification of later consent could be found after the IRS dili-
gently searched its records, the court held that the taxpayers met their evi-
dentiary burden. 22 The case was remanded and the deficiency judgments
set aside.
2 3
IV. SECTION 38 CREDITS
United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner2 4 addressed the issue of
whether regulations governing investment tax credit validly precluded the
taxpayer, a public utility, from taking a double tax credit. Under the appli-
cable state and federal regulatory provisions, 25 the taxpayer had capitalized
the depreciation on its construction equipment as part of the cost basis of the
newly constructed property and then used that basis to compute the invest-
ment tax credit. An investment tax credit was also claimed on the cost of the
same construction equipment when it qualified, resulting in essentially a
double credit for the same expenditure, once for the equipment and again as
the allocated cost of the constructed property.26 Both the equipment and
the constructed property were treated as section 38 property under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and were thus eligible for an investment tax credit.
2 7
The issue arose from the fact that transportation and construction
equipment have different useful lives and both qualify for section 38 prop-
erty credit. The court precluded the taxpayer from attempting to maximize
its investment tax credit by computing the credit in part on the equipment
and in part on the property constructed, while it gave the taxpayer the bene-
fit of the property's longer useful life.
28
The Tenth Circuit held that the purpose of the Treasury Regulations in
question 29 was clearly to prevent just such a double tax credit as was here
sought. Even though no specific statutory prohibition against it could be
found, the presumption is that statutes and regulations preclude a double
deduction.30 To the extent, then, that the ambiguities in the regulations
could be read to preclude the double credit, which was here reasonable and
consistent with the statutory language, the court upheld the regulations.
V. BONUS AND DELAY RENTALS FOR RESTRICTED TRIBE MEMBER
Clark v. United States3 1 concerned oil and gas cash bonus and delay
rental payments paid to a noncompetent, restricted member of the Five Civi-
22. Id at 442.
23. Id at 443.
24. 589 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2839 (1979).
25. Id at 1384. The applicable federal provisions are 26 U.S.C. §§ 38, 46(c)(1), (c)(l)(A);
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 46(a)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1979).
26. 589 F.2d at 1384.
27. Id at 1386.
28. The equipment was used to build facilities which qualified for investment tax credit as
section 38 property. The property and equipment here had useful lives in excess of eight years
at the time they were placed in service and were thus eligible for the maximum investment tax
credit. Id
29. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.46-3(c)(1), .48-l(b)(4).
30. 589 F.2d at 1387-88.
31. 587 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1978).
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lized Tribes on restricted, allotted Indian land. The issue was whether such
payments, when followed by oil production, were subject to federal income
tax as advance royalty. Clark, a Chickasaw Indian, had been allotted one
hundred sixty acres of land designated tax exempt for her life provided title
remained in her.32 During the period of her restricted status, an oil and gas
lease agreement had been made with respect to a portion of her homestead
and approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its capacity as her personal
guardian and trustee of her land and income.
33
The IRS contended that cash bonus and delay rental payments made at
the time of leasing a tract for oil and gas are taxed as ordinary income34 and
furthermore, when cost depletion is used, a distinction is made between those
situations where there is later commercial production and those where there
is not. 35 The IRS took the position that these general rules should apply in
the instant case. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in
granting summary judgment for Clark.
The court, affirming its decision in Un'ed States v. Daney, 36 held that
these payments to a noncompetent, restricted Chickasaw on restricted, allot-
ted Indian land were not taxable as advance royalty even though oil produc-
tion followed. The fact that production was later obtained from this lease,
which might not have been the case in Dane), was seen as a distinction with-
out a difference, 37 and the plaintiff was allowed to recover the wrongfully
paid taxes plus interest.
38
The key question became whether or not a 1928 act 39 clearly removed
the tax exemption given the tribes with respect to this land4° when applied
to cash bonus and delay rental payments made for oil and gas leases.
The court conceded that the intent of the act could be read to support
either conclusion, but decided that the legislative history and public policy
mandated a construction of these acts to favor the Indians. Citing the fact
32. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 408, § 1, 69 Stat. 666.
33. 587 F.2d at 466.
34. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
35. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a) (1960).
36. 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966).
37. 587 F.2d at 468.
38. The court mentioned briefly that arguably the government breached its duty to Mrs.
Clark insofar as it did not seek a refund of these taxes shortly after the decision in United States
v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966). 587 F.2d at 469.
39. Section 3 of the Act of May 10, 1928, ch. 517, 45 Stat. 495 is worded as follows:
That all minerals, including oil and gas, produced on or after April 26, 1931, from
restricted allotted lands of members of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, or from
inherited restricted lands of full-blood Indian heirs or devisees of such lands, shall be
subject to all State and Federal taxes of every kind and character the same as those
produced from lands owned by other citizens of the State of Oklahoma; and the Secre-
tary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid, from individ-
ual Indian funds held under his supervision and control and belonging to the Indian
owners of the lands, the tax or taxes so assessed against the royalty interest of the
respective Indian owners in such oil, gas, and other mineral producturn. (Emphasis sup-
plied).
The legislative history indicated nothing related to federal taxes, but rather a concern solely
with the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax. 587 F.2d at 468.




that Native American Indians have consistently received different tax treat-
ment than other citizens, especially with respect to restricted lands, the court
concluded that absent clear and unambiguous inclusion in a taxation
scheme, ambiguities should be resolved in the Indians' favor.
4
1
VI. FIFrH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENTS
In UnitedStates v. Brown,42 the defendant taxpayer was convicted of will-
ful failure to file his individual income tax return. Brown had filed returns
which disclosed no information from which his federal income tax liability
could be computed, inserting words such as "unknown" or "Fifth Amend-
ment" in the blanks provided for dollar amounts. 43 Taking the position that
filing a return containing no information is tantamount to filing no return at
all, the court rejected the defendant's arguments that he could not be con-
victed of failure to file a return when he did file a return.
44
The court rejected Brown's attempts to employ the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as a defense. While the fifth amendment
can be invoked to protect one from revealing an illegal source of income, it
does not protect one from disclosing the amount of such income on a tax
return.
45
As to the defendant's contention that he had been denied a speedy trial
under the sixth amendment and the Speedy Trial Act,46 the court articu-
lated several factors of inquiry. First, where the information was filed
against a defendant before July 1, 1976, as in this case, the Speedy Trial Act
did not apply.47 Secondly, despite the fact that thirteen months had elapsed
between the filing of the information against Brown and the trial, the court
was reluctant to find a speedy trial deprivation absent any prejudice to the
defendant. Since the delay was due to the judge's illness and overcrowded
dockets, the delay had not been sought by the government to prejudice the
defendant, and since the defendant had not demanded a speedy trial or es-
tablished that the delay prejudiced him, the Tenth Circuit found no viola-
tion of Brown's constitutional rights.
48
Brown further asserted unsuccessfully that evidence obtained from third
parties through IRS summons should be suppressed. The IRS had issued a
summons to Brown's bank to produce records material to his tax liability.
The court upheld the issuance of such summons even where an investigation
41. 587 F.2d at 467-68.
42. 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. Id at 251.
44. Id at 252.
45. Id (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), and United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259 (1927)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1976).
47. 600 F.2d at 253 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3163(b) (1976); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d
929, 932 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978)).
48. 600 F.2d at 253-54. The Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
invoked a balancing test with respect to the type of constitutional violation alleged here. In
weighing the circumstances, the Court considered four factors, not necessarily an exclusive list:
the length of the delay, the reason therefor, timely assertion by the defendant of the right, and
prejudice to the defendant.
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pursuing both civil and possible criminal consequences exists, explaining
that such summons can be used to aid an investigation which is seeking to
determine whether criminal conduct has occurred, but such summons must
be issued in good faith and prior to the recommendation to the Justice De-
partment for criminal prosecution. 49 No constitutional violations were
found insofar as bank records are neither owned nor possessed by the tax-
payer, because the incriminating evidence of third parties is not tantamount
to testifying against oneself, and because no valid expectation of privacy ex-
ists in bank records.
50
Brown also alleged a violation of his sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel, but the court found the argument to be merely an
excuse and delay tactic. Explaining that the sixth amendment does not con-
template lay representation, rather it anticipates representation by a person
authorized to practice law, the court looked to the facts: Brown had failed
repeatedly to get a lawyer with over a year to do so; in addition, appoint-
ment of counsel by the court just prior to the trial, and the fact that the
court had allowed Brown to represent himself were considered procedurally
sufficient, especially since the record failed to establish any mockery of jus-
tice or ineffectiveness of representation. 5'
Valerie Golden
49. 600 F.2d at 255 (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 307 (1978);
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 521, 533, 536 (1971); United States v. Billingsley, 469
F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972); I.R.C. § 7602, as amended in 1976.
50. 600 F.2d at 256. See general'y Mills, The ff/hA Amendment Pnri/ege and Other Protections
Against Self-Inmmination in Federal Tax Investigations, 43 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1978); I FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 506 (1973).
51. 600 F.2d at 256-58.
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